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BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC CHOICE:
THE BEHAVIORAL PARADOX OF
GOVERNMENT POLICY
W. KIP Viscusi* & TED GAYER'
I. OVERVIEW
What are the economic justifications for government inter-
vention in the economy? In a market economy, prices coordi-
nate the activities of buyers and sellers and convey information
about the strength of consumer demand for a good and the
costs of supplying it. Because trade is voluntary, buyers and
sellers only make exchanges when both parties benefit. Under
ideal market conditions, this process leads to an efficient alloca-
tion of goods without government intervention.
However, economics has long recognized instances in which
markets can fail to lead to an efficient outcome. The long-standing
view is that either market power or the nonexistence of markets
causes market failures. Market power is present when some indi-
viduals or firms are price makers (for example, monopolists) ra-
ther than participants in a perfectly competitive environment.
Such situations typically lead to the production of a less than effi-
cient quantity of goods. The problem of market power is the pur-
view of industrial organization economics and antitrust policy.'
The nonexistence of markets, or the failure of a robust market to
arise, can occur for a number of reasons, such as asymmetric in-
formation (when one party in a transaction has information that is
not available to another) and public goods (when a good is non-
rival and nonexcludable in consumption and thus likely to be un-
* University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and Management,
Vanderbilt Law School, 131 21st Ave. South, Nashville, TN 37203. kip.viscusi@
vanderbilt.edu. We are grateful to the Mercatus Center for their support.
** Vice President and Director, Economic Studies, Brookings Institution, 1775
Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20036. tgayer@brookings.edu.
1. HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 46-48 (10th ed. 2013).
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dersupplied by the market). Another cause for the nonexistence of
markets is externalities, which occur when transactions impose
costs or benefits on a third party that are not considered in the
market exchange. A classic example is when a factory produces
and sells a good to a consumer to their mutual advantage, but the
pollution generated by the production of the good has a negative
impact on the health of nearby residents. A market for the clean
air in the affected area would not emerge if high transaction costs
of organizing the pollution victims prevented the parties from
negotiating.2 The market system will fail to internalize the health
costs imposed by the factory's operations and lead to inefficiently
high production and health consequences.
For about a century, economists have argued that policymakers
should rely, when possible, on market-based principles in design-
ing regulations to address these market failures. For example, in
the pollution cases above, a tax on production equal to the mar-
ginal external costs could lead producers to internalize the third-
party costs stemming from production, which would result in an
efficient outcome.3 Similarly, establishing a property right for the
clean air (for example, through a cap-and-trade program) could
also cause producers to internalize the third-party costs in their
market decisions, again resulting in an efficient outcome.
But in recent years, economics has seen a change from the
traditional approach of evaluating market failures and in the
justifications for government intervention in the economy, with
implications for when and how the government should inter-
vene. Recent research has focused on identifying cognitive lim-
itations and psychological biases that lead people to make
choices that cause self-harm, thus suggesting another type of
market failure that justifies government intervention.4 We refer
to these phenomena as behavioral failures in that they often
involve departures from the individual rationality assumptions
incorporated in economists' models of consumer choice.
2. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
3. ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 1, at 84-85.
4. As is common in the behavioral economics literature, we classify cognitive
limitations and psychological biases as market failures, even though they reflect
problems with individual preferences, not systemic problems with the incentives
and institutions that represent the traditional market failures.
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William Congdon, Jeffrey Kling, and Sendhil Mullainathan
classify deviations from standard economic assumptions found
in psychology and behavioral economics into three categories:
imperfect optimization, bounded self-control, and nonstandard
preferences.5 Imperfect optimization challenges the traditional
economics view that people are good at making decisions con-
cerning their own well-being. For example, one study suggests
that people are less likely to participate in their employer's re-
tirement plan as the number of investment alternatives rises,
thus suggesting that a government policy of limiting options
could improve welfare.6 Another study finds that the salience
of a sales tax (which differs depending on whether the tax is
included in the sticker price or computed at the register) influ-
ences the behavior of consumers, even though the net price the
consumer pays is the same in both cases.7
Bounded self-control challenges the traditional economics view
that, even when people know what they want, they are unable to
act on these interests. These bounded self-control findings include
evidence of procrastination and succumbing to immediate temp-
tation, both of which can result in self-harm.8 The nonstandard
preferences phenomenon challenges some of the standard eco-
nomic assumptions about choice, such as that people value the
end state rather than the path taken to achieve an outcome. For
example, psychology and behavioral economics find that people
value a good differently depending on whether they were ran-
5. WILLIAM J. CONGDON, JEFFREY R. KLING & SENDIL MULLAINATHAN, POLICY AND
CHOICE: PUBLIC FINANCE THROUGH THE LENS OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 7 (2011).
6. See Sheena Sethi-Iyengar, Gur Huberman & Wei Jiang, How Much Choice is
Too Much? Contributions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUC-
TURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 83, 88-91 (O.S. Mitchell & S.
Utkus eds., 2004). Some more recent articles have argued that this apparently
flawed decision making when confronting seemingly excessive choices may be a
rational response to nonzero search costs not taken into account by Sethi-Iyengar
et al. See Dmitri Kuksov & J. Miguel Villas-Boas, When More Alternatives Lead to
Less Choice, 29 MARKETING SCIENCE 507, 519 (2010).
7. Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evi-
dence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145, 1175 (2009).
8. CONGDON, KLING & MULLAINATHAN, supra note 5, at 7.
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domly endowed with the good,9 and also that people do not value
losses and comparable gains symmetrically.10
Reasonable critiques of the behavioral economics findings
abound. For example, many of the findings of deviation from ra-
tional behavior take place in laboratory or field experiment set-
tings. Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker is critical of the rele-
vance of this practice, noting that "there is a heck of a difference
between demonstrating something in a laboratory, in experi-
ments, even highly sophisticated experiments, and showing that
they are important in the marketplace."" Becker also points out
that "some of the defects in behavior claimed by behaviorists tend
... to be eliminated in an exchange economy."2 Indeed, one
study of the market for sports memorabilia finds that the market
experience of card traders leads to the elimination of the endow-
ment effect.13 Further, some of the findings suggesting irrationali-
ty are questioned among psychologists. One study concluded that
the "conjunction fallacy"14 found in some psychological studies is
due to the wording used in the experiments (such as using "prob-
able" instead of "relative frequencies") and contextual interpreta-
tion by the participants rather than a failure of logic.
5
In this Article we examine a wide range of behavioral failures,
such as those linked to misperception of risks, unwarranted aver-
sion to risk ambiguity, inordinate aversion to losses, and incon-
sistencies in the tradeoffs reflected in individual decisions. Alt-
9. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests
of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. OF POL. ECON. 1342, 1343 (1990).
10. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
of Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).




13. John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J.
ECON. 41, 70-71 (2003).
14. The "conjunction fallacy" is a phenomenon whereby experimental subjects
appear to assess the probability of A and B together as being more likely than the
probability of A generally-a logical impossibility. For example in the famous
"Linda problem" subjects are given a profile of Linda as a young outspoken intel-
lectual involved in social causes and indicate that it is more likely that Linda is a
bank teller and a feminist than that she is a bank teller.
15. Ralph Hertwig & Gerd Gigerenzer, The 'Conjunction Fallacy' Revisited: How
Intelligent Inferences Look Like Reasoning Errors, 12 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAK-
ING 275, 276, 300 (1999).
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hough such shortcomings have been documented in the behav-
ioral literature, they are also reflected in government policies, both
because policymakers are also human and because public pres-
sures incorporate these biases. The result is that government poli-
cies often institutionalize rather than overcome behavioral
anomalies. This idea is the principal theme of Viscusi's Rational
Risk Policy, which documents a wide range of parallels between
the systematic failures in risky private decisions and government
risk policies.16 These institutional irrationalities pertain quite gen-
erally to government policies and are not restricted to regulations
directly affecting consumer behavior. In this Article, we also find
that the government often relies on command-and-control regula-
tion, even when the insights of the behavioral iterature counsel a
more flexible regulatory approach.
II. BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY
This Article examines the common policy implications-not
the specific empirical findings-of the behavioral economics lit-
erature, which frequently recommends "soft paternalism" poli-
cies that seek to change the structure of the choices available to
individuals in order to encourage a more desirable outcome.
But, as behavioral agents themselves, policymakers and regula-
tors are subject to the same psychological biases and limitations
as all individuals.17 Many, although certainly not all, behavioral
economics papers focus on the biases and heuristics of ordinary
individuals, while seemingly ignoring that regulators are people
too and thus subject to the same psychological forces. One study
finds that, of the behavioral economics articles proposing pater-
nalistic policy responses, 95.5% do not contain any analysis of
the cognitive abilities of policymakers.18 Congdon, Kling, and
16. W. Kip ViscusI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY (1998). See also W. Kip Viscusi &
James Hamilton, Are Risk Regulators Rational? Evidence from Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Decisions, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1010 (1999). For a further discussion of how
behavioral anomalies among the citizenry can impact public policy, see generally
BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE
BAD POLICIES (2008).
17. See generally Slavisa Tasic, Are Regulators Rational?, 17 J. DES ECONOMISTES ET
DES ETUDES HUMAINES 1145 (2011); Slavisa Tasic, The Illusion of Regulatory Compe-
tence, 21 CRITICAL REV. 423 (2009).
18. Niclas Berggren, Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in
behavioral economics, 25 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 199, 200 (2012).
No. 31
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Mullainathan acknowledge that "behavioral economics creates
something of a paradox in requiring more of policymakers-
such as new judgments about identifying and distinguishing
behavioral tendencies -while suggesting that policymakers' ca-
pacity to make such judgments may be impaired to the extent
that they too are behavioral agents."19 Unfortunately, they sub-
sequently put this view aside. Similarly, Professor Cass Sunstein
observes, "For every bias identified for individuals, there is an
accompanying bias in the public sphere."2"
The question then is whether private decision makers acting
in the marketplace are more or less prone to psychological bi-
ases than are the public decision makers who regulate the
economy, whether through traditional regulations or through
"nudges" that seek to change the choice architecture in a way
that leads people to choose more optimal actions. This ap-
proach parallels the traditional public finance calculus of
weighing the inefficiencies caused by market failures against
the inefficiencies caused by government failures in attempting
to address market failures through regulations.
21
There are two main reasons why regulatory responses motivat-
ed by behavioral economics findings might be suboptimal.2 The
first, as already mentioned, is that as behavioral agents them-
selves, regulators are not immune from the psychological biases
that affect ordinary people. The second is that policymakers are
subject to public choice incentives that could further lead to poli-
cies that reduce welfare, and indeed could lead to the misuse of
behavioral findings by regulators in order to enhance regulatory
control or favor the influence of powerful special interests over
19. CONGDON, KLING & MULLAINATHAN, supra note 5, at 56.
20. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNAL-
ISM 102 (2012).
21. See generally CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE VERSUS MARKET FAIL-
URE: MICROECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE (2006).
22. For additional views of the problems with basing regulations on behavioral
economics findings, see generally Robert Sugden, Why incoherent preferences do not
justify paternalism, 19 CONST. POL. ECON. 226 (2008) (arguing that mutual ad-
vantage aspect of market transactions does not require coherent preferences) and
Jayson L. Lusk, Are you smart enough to know what to eat? A critique of behavioral
economics as justification for regulation, 41 EUR. REV. OF AGRIC. ECON. 355 (2014)
(arguing that cognitive biases alone do not justify regulatory intervention).
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the interests of public welfare.23 By focusing on these two issues,
this Article seeks to answer Sunstein's call for the creation of a
field in "behavioral public choice theory."24
There are a number of public choice arguments about why
private decision making might be less prone to errors than
public decision making.25 The most obvious argument is that
psychological failings in citizens would suggest bad decision
making in their voting practices at least as much as in their
market transactions. To the extent that policies are decided
through a majority voting system, then under certain condi-
tions, the median voter will determine the policy response.
26 If
the median voter is subject to behavioral biases as suggested by
the psychology literature, then the resulting policy is likely to
be suboptimal. In other words, in a democratic system, theory
and evidence suggest that government policies will reflect the
irrationalities of ordinary people.
27
Public choice theory also suggests that private decision mak-
ers have stronger incentives to acquire information-
expending both time and money-to overcome behavioral bi-
ases, since the personal costs to a citizen who makes a bad de-
cision are higher than the personal costs to the regulator of a
rule that leads to a bad outcome for that citizen. There is some
experimental evidence that, at least for some kinds of decisions,
people with incentives can partially reduce cognitive biases
through learning,28 and given that the costs of cognitive biases
weigh more on the citizen than on the regulator, one should
expect fewer errors among private than among public decision
makers. Finally, public choice studies have also found that,
23. GORDON TULLOCK, ARTHUR SELDON & GORDON L. BRADY, GOVERNMENT
FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 87 (2002).
24. SUNSTEIN, supra note 20, at 100.
25. For a summary, see generally Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology,
29 REGULATION 32 (2006)
26. RANDALL HOLCOMBE, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMIcs: THE ROLE OF GOVERN-
MENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 155 (2005).
27. See generally Bryan Caplan, supra note 16, at 10; Jan Schnellenbach & Chris-
tian Schubert, Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey (CESifo, Working Paper No.
4988, 2014).
28. See Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in
Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 7, 34-35 (1999).
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where a policy has high but diffuse costs and low but concen-
trated benefits (such as a trade-liberalizing policy that im-
proves net benefits, but does so by providing small benefits to
many consumers while providing concentrated costs to a few
producers), the stronger incentives of the few may have greater
influence than the preferences of the many, possibly leading to
inefficient policies.29 This tendency would suggest that gov-
ernment policies aimed at addressing the deliberate manipula-
tion of the choice architecture that occurs in the marketplace
are also prone to deliberate manipulation by regulators in a
way that leads to suboptimal outcomes.
Our focus on behavioral public choice suggests a need for cau-
tion in using the findings of individual biases to justify greater
government intervention, even for soft paternalism policies that
seek to protect a degree of individual choice. This is not to suggest
that all behavioral justifications for government intervention are
invalid and inevitably prone to misuse. Daniel Kahneman consid-
ers two modes of thinking: System 1 "operates automatically and
quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control,"
while System 2 "allocates attention to the effortful mental activi-
ties that demand it, including complex computations."30 The bias-
es that lead to suboptimal personal behavior typically result from
actions dominated by the "freewheeling impulses" of our System
1 rather than the "conscious, reasoning self" of System 2.31 Behav-
ioral economists who advocate for more soft paternalism policies
are essentially motivated by the belief that government techno-
crats are, by nature, training, and employment, disposed toward
System 2 thinking and can therefore design policies that overcome
the problems caused by System 1 reasoning.32 Some critics, how-
ever, contend that the narrowness of the expertise of government
technocrats will subject them to overconfidence caused by the il-
lusion of explanatory depth,33 that such experts will have a lim-
ited and biased understanding compared to the information pro-
29. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 392 (1983).
30. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20-21 (2011).
31. Id. at 21.
32. Id. at 48.
33. See Tasic, Illusion, supra note 17, at 430.
[Vol. 38
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vided by a more decentralized approach,34 and that the use of
government nudges to limit individual choice will reduce auton-
omy, dignity, and the motivation of individuals to engage and
nurture their System 2 reasoning.5 The behavioral public choice
approach seeks to weigh the political incentives and psychological
biases of government decision making and critique the optimistic
view of a government composed of well-meaning technocrats
who are better equipped than ordinary citizens to overcome pur-
ported System 1 biases.
III. BEHAVIORAL RATIONALES FOR GOVERNMENT POLICY
The prominent role of behavioral rationales for government
regulation is exemplified by the recent wave of government
initiatives by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) mandating energy-efficiency
levels for many major consumer durable goods. In an earlier
paper, we examined these regulations and found that the tradi-
tional market failure justifications (for example, externalities
and asymmetric information) are incidental to an assessment of
the merits of these regulations.3 6 Rather, the agencies justify
these regulations based on the contention that consumers suf-
fer from psychological biases that lead them to make irrational
choices in their purchases of durables.
There is a long-standing empirical finding, known as the en-
ergy-efficiency gap, which shows that consumer choices for en-
ergy-efficiency purchases imply a discount rate much higher
than market discount rates. This finding suggests that consum-
ers underestimate the future cost savings stemming from an en-
ergy-efficient product compared to the weight they put on fu-
ture savings in other market settings.37 This apparent bias could
34. See F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 524
(1945).
35. Jeremy Waldron, It's All for Your Own Good, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct. 9, 2014,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/09/cass-sunstein-its-all-your-
own-good/ [http://perma.cc/Y9JP-ATEX]; Steven Poole, Not so foolish, AEON (2014).
36. Ted Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, Overriding consumer preferences with energy regu-
lations, 43 J. REG. ECON. 248, 249 (2013).
37. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman, Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and
Utilization of Energy-Using Durables, 10 BELL J. OF ECON. 33, 50-52 (1979). Recent
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arise from irrational consumer behavior driven by psychological
heuristics. Some studies find evidence that people make deci-
sions regarding which appliances to purchase based on current
energy prices rather than on expected future prices, leading to a
tendency to forgo purchasing energy-efficient products.38 How-
ever, other studies find that consumers reasonably base their
forecasts of energy prices on current prices and therefore do not
present a behavioral market failure.39 Yet other studies find that
the psychological "salience" of the more expensive, efficient ap-
pliance leads to underinvestment in energy efficiency.
40
However, alternative explanations for the energy-efficiency gap
exist that are consistent with individual rationality. The observed
consumer choice may simply reflect actual consumer prefer-
ences.41 For example, the high implied discount rates could be a
rational response to high sunk costs and uncertainty over future
conservation savings.42 If you are planning to move or you have a
liquidity problem, buying the more energy-efficient but more ex-
pensive appliance may not make sense. Many of the studies pur-
porting to show that consumers forgo profitable energy decisions
are based on engineering studies that calculate the net present
value of a set of possible energy-efficiency consumption choices,
which requires assumptions concerning such things as capital
costs, current and future energy prices, duration and frequency of
appliance use, and discount rates.43 These studies omit other rele-
vant costs or benefits that can drive the purchase decision.
studies suggest little evidence of consumer myopia with respect to automobile
fuel economy. See Meghan R. Busse, Christopher R. Knittel & Florian Zettelmeyer,
Are Consumers Myopic? Evidence from New and Used Car Purchases, 103 AM. ECON.
REV. 220, 221 (2013).
38. Willett Kempton & Laura Montgomery, Folk Quantification of Energy, 7 EN-
ERGY 817, 822-23, 826 (1982).
39. Soren T. Anderson, Ryan Kellogg & James M. Sallee, What Do Consumers
Believe About Future Gasoline Prices? 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 16974, 2011).
40. Charlie Wilson & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Models of Decision Making and Residen-
tial Energy Use, 32 ANN. REV. OF ENV'T & RESOURCES 169, 175 (2007).
41. Jerry A. Hausman & Paul L. Joskow, Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of Ap-
pliance Efficiency Standards, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 220, 222 (1982).
42. Kevin A. Hassett & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Energy conservation investment: Do
consumers discount the future correctly?, 21 ENERGY POL'Y 710, 710 (1993).
43. See, e.g., McKINSEY & Co., ELECTRIC POWER AND NATURAL GAS: UNLOCKING
ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY, July 2009, http://www.mckinsey.com/
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Another possible explanation for the energy-efficiency gap
findings is that consumers do not expect to receive as high a
return in energy savings as the regulatory analyst assumes.
This might be the case if, for instance, engineering estimates of
potential savings misrepresent energy savings because they are
based on highly controlled studies that do not directly apply to
actual realized savings in a representative house. There is some
evidence that engineering estimates of energy savings are in-
deed faulty.44 For example, Gilbert Metcalf and Kevin Hassett
find that the realized return on attic insulation falls short of the
returns promised by engineers and product manufacturers.
45
Accounting for this discrepancy eliminates the paradox of the
energy-efficiency gap in this situation.46
Another approach to measuring the energy-efficiency gap is
to use empirical studies of energy-use data to estimate the av-
erage returns for the set of consumers that adopt an energy-
efficient technology, such as by comparing natural-gas billing
data in the first year after weatherization work is done to the
same data from the previous year. In addition to the problem
associated with a short-time horizon, these studies also suffer
from the common pitfalls associated with omitted variable bias
in which other key factors affecting the decision are ignored.
As Hunt Allcott and Michael Greenstone explain, such studies
can omit many relevant costs and benefits.47 For example,
weatherizing a home can be a time-consuming and unpleasant
task for the homeowner. Weatherization can also yield benefits
not measured by billing data, such as greater home comfort. Fail-
ing to account for these factors that contribute to the consumption
decision can lead to spurious findings of an energy-efficiency gap.
clientservice/electricpowematuralgas/downloads/US energyefficiencyfull_
report.pdf [http://perma.cc/3KXK-GY5F].
44. Steve Nadel & Kenneth Keating, Engineering Estimates vs. Impact Evaluation
Results: How Do They Compare and Why? 3, 6 (Research Report U915, American
Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, January 1, 1991), available at http://
www.aceee.org/research-report/u915 [http://perma.ccUM7C-42B7].
45. Gilbert E. Metcalf & Kevin A. Hassett, Measuring the Energy Savings from
Home Improvement Investments: Evidence from Monthly Billing Data, 81 REV. OF
ECON. & STAT. 516, 516 (1999).
46. Id. at 516, 527.
47. Hunt Allcott & Michael Greenstone, Is There an Energy Efficiency Gap? 14 (Mass.
Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. 12-03, January 1, 2012). See also Hunt Allcott, Con-
sumers' Perceptions and Misperceptions of Energy Costs, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 98 (2011).
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Taken as a whole, the literature on the energy-efficiency gap
does not provide strong, credible evidence of persistent con-
sumer irrationality. Nonetheless, government agencies justified
the energy-efficiency mandates on the basis of correcting con-
sumer irrationality, even though they offer little or no evidence
that consumers are causing self-harm in their purchasing deci-
sions concerning the regulated consumer durables. Again, in
an earlier paper, we found that the preponderance of the esti-
mated benefits stemming from most energy-efficiency regula-
tions derive from this presumption of addressing consumer
irrationality, not from reducing the external costs associated
with energy use.48 For example, for the recent fuel economy
mandates for passenger cars and light trucks, the Department
of Transportation estimated a total cost of $177 billion and a
total benefit of $521 billion. 41 Of the $521 billion in benefits (as-
suming a discount rate of three percent and constant 2009 dol-
lars), fully $440 billion (or eighty-five percent) stems from the
purported benefits of addressing consumer i rationality.50 The
evidence that consumers undervalue fuel economy is very
weak, and the upper bound estimates of consumer mispercep-
tions suggest benefits much smaller than those estimated by
the regulatory agencies.51 For the same rule, the Environmental
Protection Agency estimated that eighty-seven percent of the
total benefits (estimated at $613 billion) were due to addressing
consumer irrationality. We found that the purported need to
address consumer irrationality was also a large driver in other
energy-efficiency regulations, including fuel economy stand-
ards for heavy-duty vehicles, clothes dryers, room air condi-
tioners, and incandescent light bulbs.52
This approach by the agencies to justify their regulations
based on weak evidence of consumer irrationality illustrates a
key negative consequence of misusing behavioral findings: the
welfare loss associated with ignoring heterogeneous preferences.
The one-size-fits-all approach that ignores potential heterogenei-
48. Gayer & Viscusi, supra note 36, at 249.
49. Id. at 251.
50. Id.
51. Hunt Allcott, The Welfare Effects of Misperceived Product Costs: Data and Cali-
brations from the Automobile Market, 5 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y 30, 32 (2013).
52. Gayer & Viscusi, supra note 36, at 257-63.
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ty in consumer preferences is most common in command-and-
control regulations (such as energy-efficiency mandates), but
even the soft paternalism approach steers all people in the same
direction. Differences in preferences and income generate differ-
ent levels of consumer demand for products. Even for products
all consumers might find attractive, there will be differences in
preference; some consumers are willing to pay more for the
product than others, giving rise to the usual downward-sloping
demand for the product. There will also be more extreme situa-
tions in which some consumers may not want a product at any
price even though others may value it, as in the case of vegetari-
ans who do not wish to consume meat. In recognition of such
differences, the market often generates highly differentiated
products, ranging for instance from very basic automobiles,
which serve as a functional form of transportation, to luxury
cars. Homogenizing these choices through command-and-
control regulations, or even through more subtle manipulation
of the choice architecture, imposes costs on those with prefer-
ences outside of the allowable options.
The fuel economy mandate also provides evidence in support
of William Niskanen's public choice view that regulators will
attempt to maximize their authority rather than social welfare.
53
The behavioral economics approach recommends soft paternal-
ism options over regulations. Indeed, a broad reading of this lit-
erature counsels in favor of many welfare-improving policies
that change existing hard regulations to soft, nudge-like regula-
tions. In other words, behavioral economics does not and should
not only justify more traditional government interventions; in
many cases it should justify a reduction in regulatory power.
Public choice theory, however, suggests that regulators would
be more prone to use behavioral findings to justify increasing
regulatory power than to move toward softening regulations.
The fuel economy regulation is a case in point. The EPA's
and DOT's analyses find that the preponderance of the benefits
stem from correcting purported consumer irrationality, not
from reducing externalities. This raises the question of why a
rigid mandate is warranted rather than an informational regu-
53. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN-
MENT 36 (1971).
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lation that would nudge consumers to make sounder choices.
Indeed, in 2011 the EPA did just that by issuing its Motor Vehi-
cle Fuel Economy Label Final Rule.54 The mandated label for all
new cars is quite extensive, including an overall miles per gal-
lon (mpg) rating, a city mpg rating, a highway mpg rating, gal-
lons per 100 miles, driving range on a tank of gas, fuel costs in
five years versus the average new vehicle, annual fuel costs,
fuel economy and greenhouse gas rating, and smog rating.55
These components of the label address the purported behav-
ioral failures in that they (i) indicate the longer-term fuel costs,
thus diminishing the effect of high discount rates, (ii) make the
benefits of fuel economy salient and a less "shrouded" attrib-
ute, (iii) provide easy calculations of fuel economy, (iv) enable
consumers to understand the actual fuel economy benefits ra-
ther than relying on rough rules of thumb, (v) make it clear that
fuel economy is a valued vehicle attribute, not a proxy for a
less expensive vehicle, (vi) make it easier for consumers to
identify which vehicles provide fuel economy, (vii) provide
diverse measures of fuel economy that consumers can relate to
their driving style, and (viii) make the fuel costs more apparent
as an upfront cost similar to the sticker price of a vehicle. In-
deed, the EPA label rule is directed at remedying almost all of
the types of consumer choice failures that the EPA claims ac-
count for the private benefits of fuel economy standards.
What is striking about the EPA's regulatory impact analysis
of the fuel economy mandates is that it does not even mention
the existence of the agency's own new label rule.56 This over-
sight goes to the heart of the fuel economy standard analysis,
as most of the benefits needed to justify the regulation relate to
consumer choice failures targeted by the new labeling rule. The
EPA analysis of the fuel economy mandate should address the
effectiveness of the label rule and the degree to which it ame-
liorates the need for an additional mandate. It is not necessarily
54. Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. 39, 478 (July 6, 2011).
55. Id. at 39, 478-80.
56. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA-420-R-12-016, REGULATO-
RY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FINAL RULING FOR 2017-2025 LIGHT-DUTY VEHICLE GREEN-




inconsistent to have both a labeling rule and a fuel economy
mandate, but any assessment of the desirability of a fuel econ-
omy should take into account the impact of the labeling regula-
tion and the role of differences in consumer preferences. If the
label rule is completely worthless and generates no benefits for
consumer choice, then the EPA was remiss in issuing the regu-
lation, and the Office of Management and Budget, the watch-
dog over all major new federal regulations, was remiss in per-
mitting the agency to move forward with a rule that other EPA
assessments implicitly treat as worthless.
5 7
Although the agencies' analyses of the energy-efficiency stand-
ards invoke broad references to the behavioral economics litera-
ture to justify their presumption of consumer irrationality, no-
where in these analyses do they invoke behavioral findings that
could suggest a diminished need for regulation. For example,
findings from the psychology and behavioral economics literature
suggest that people care about the outcomes realized by others.
These other-regarding preferences mean that people might volun-
tarily internalize the costs of their actions to others, mitigating the
need for regulations to address pollution externalities. The exist-
ence of other-regarding preferences would also suggest ap-
proaches other than mandates to reduce energy use. Indeed, some
studies suggest hat economic incentives can discourage pro-
social, other-regarding behavior,8 undermining the standard eco-
nomic argument for pollution taxes to address externalities. Nu-
merous findings suggest that social norms influence individual
behavior, including one study that found evidence of a "conspic-
uous conservation effect," in which people value the "green halo"
signal of owning a Prius over other, more traditional-looking hy-
brid vehicles.5 9 Other studies suggest that providing feedback to
customers on energy use with a focus on peer comparisons leads
57. Cf. John D. Graham & Cory R. Liu, Regulatory and Quasi-Regulatory Activity
Without 0MB and Cost-Benefit Review, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 425,431-39 (2014).
58. See, e.g., Roland B6nabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96
AM. ECON. REV. 1652, 1654 (2006).
59. Steven E. Sexton & Alison L. Sexton, Conspicuous Conservation: The Prius Ef-
fect and Willingness to Pay for Environmental Bona Fides 1-2, 22 (UC Berkeley, Work-
ing Paper, 2010).
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to a reduction in energy consumption at a low cost.6° Nonetheless,
we are not aware of any instances where softer regulations that
provide information to influence social norms were considered in
the regulatory agencies' analyses of the various energy-efficiency
mandates for consumer durables.
IV. FAILURES OF RISK PERCEPTION AND RISK ASSESSMENT
A major and well-documented class of failures of rationality
in individual choices pertains to the assessment and perception
of the probability levels of different outcomes. In this Part we
focus on behavioral failures linked to what is termed "risk,"
and in Part V we address closely-related issues concerning am-
biguity surrounding risk levels. The risk-related concerns per-
tain to the absolute levels of a probability and possible changes
in these levels, whereas the uncertainty concerns address im-
precision and ambiguity involved in the assessed risk levels.
We describe how government policies that reflect individual
behavioral anomalies with respect to risk and uncertainty lead
to suboptimal outcomes.
How risk and uncertainty enter the decision process depends
on the decision context and the normative reference point. In
the case of government policies, the normative assumption that
we adopt in guiding our discussion is that policies should be
based on a comparison of the expected costs with the expected
benefits, where the probabilities used in these calculations are
the mean values of the probabilities. Thus, we assume that the
precision of the probabilistic judgments should not be a con-
sideration. It is the best estimate of the probability levels, not
the worst-case or best-case assumptions regarding the level of
the risk, that should guide risk assessments.61
Environmental risks provide an instructive context for consid-
ering how probabilities enter the regulatory impact analysis. The
expected benefits for EPA regulations often are expressed in terms
60. Ian Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments That Peer Compari-
son Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 15386, 2009).
61. We explore possible exceptions to this principle below. In situations in
which learning about the probabilities can take place, the precision of the proba-
bilities also enters as a pertinent concern.
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such as the expected number of cancer cases prevented, calculated
using the probability of cancer and the size of the exposed popu-
lation. These expected health effects are then weighted by the
agency's monetary valuation of these cancer risks to make the
cancer case reduction benefits in the same monetary terms as the
regulatory costs, thus facilitating a comparison of the benefits and
costs.62 One might, of course, choose to adopt a normative policy
criterion other than a benefit-cost framework. The biases that we
discuss below are also pertinent to addressing behavioral para-
doxes with respect to many other policy frameworks not tied to a
benefit-cost approach, but it is useful to have a reference point for
a concrete policy evaluation to frame our discussion.
One of the best-documented biases people exhibit in thinking
about risky choices is in their perceptions of the absolute level of
risk. An early example in this literature is the study by Sarah Lich-
tenstein et al.,63 which analyzed people's assessment of the level of
different mortality risks. They found that the public tends to over-
estimate low probability risks of death and underestimate large
risks.64 That is, real threats to health- such as the risks of stroke,
cancer, and heart disease-tend to be underestimated, although
the less consequential threats-such as the risks of botulism,
lightning strikes, and natural disasters -tend to be overestimated.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky incorporated this systemat-
ic bias in risk beliefs with respect to the level of the actual risk into
their widely used prospect theory model.65 Note that their model
is a predictive framework that indicates how people actually
make decisions rather than a normative framework that specifies
how they should make decisions. Whether the kinds of departures
from economic rationality that are incorporated in the prospect
theory model and other behavioral frameworks also affect gov-
ernment policy is a key focus of this Article.
62. These costs and benefits are often quite substantial. See, e.g., OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES
13-18 (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2014-cb/
draft_2014cost benefit-report-updated.pdf [http://perma.cc/WV4Y-YGDW].
63. See generally Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency ofLethal Events, 4 J. OF
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 551 (1978).
64. Id. at 574.
65. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Deci-
sion under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
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The systematic bias in which small risks are overestimated
and large risks are underestimated has two additional implica-
tions. First, because people tend to overestimate small proba-
bilities, when these small risks are eliminated, they will tend to
overestimate the risk reduction that takes place. Similarly, this
property creates a substantial potential for overreactions to
small risks, such as those posed by weak carcinogens and na-
noparticles. If a risk has increased from zero to some small pos-
itive value, people will tend to overestimate the extent of the
increase. The alarmist reactions to newly discovered carcino-
gens in food or beverages would fit this profile.
A second ramification of the pattern of overestimating small
risks and underestimating large risks is that perceptions in effect
flatten out the relationship between perceived risks and actual
risks. People may tend to underestimate the change in risk levels
for nonzero levels of risk. As a consequence, they will tend to
under-assess the benefits derived from risk improvements un-
less the improvements are successful in eliminating the risk.66
Thus, for example, people may tend to underestimate the risk
reduction benefits derived from using seat belts, providing a po-
tential impetus for government requirements regarding self-
protection, such as mandating the use of seat belts in cars.67
Biased risk perceptions are not limited to private parties.
Whether government policy overcomes these types of irrational-
ity linked to the level of the risk probability-or instead institu-
tionalizes them-depends on the strength of public pressures on
the agency and the possible presence of similar failures of ra-
tionality by government officials. Government agencies could be
better suited to making more accurate risk assessments if they
have additional and unbiased information about the risks that
the general public may not have. Government bureaucrats who
have a professional involvement in particular risk areas could
have more accurate beliefs because they have obtained more in-
formation than the average citizen has about the true risks in-
volved. Government agencies have the expertise and staff to stay
66. VISCUSI, supra note 16, at 25; Viscusi & Hamilton, supra note 16, at 1010.
67. The presence and extent of such a general perceptional bias does in fact af-
fect the particular decision context and should be corroborated in each instance
rather than assuming that all private decisions are necessarily flawed and that the
extent of the market failure is sufficient to warrant overriding private decisions.
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informed about the evolving scientific evidence with respect to
risk, thus relying more on Kahneman's System 2 thinking when
evaluating these risks. There appear to be some benefits to famil-
iarity with risks in terms of being able to make sound risk judg-
ments. For example, survey evidence demonstrates that judges
have more accurate risk assessments of various kinds of death
than does the general public, as judges tend to overestimate
small risks and underestimate large risks to a lesser extent than
does the public.6" Such superior knowledge is quite plausible, as
judges have handled or have read about numerous cases involv-
ing accidents and various tort-related hazards.
Unfortunately, in many instances government policies serve
to incorporate the same kinds of risk perception biases plagu-
ing individual risk judgments. Thus, government officials' ac-
cess to additional information does not mean that they take ad-
vantage of greater knowledge about risks to form unbiased
assessments of risks. There may be systematic biases in agen-
cies' risk assessments toward devoting inordinate attention to
worst-case scenarios. The hazardous waste cleanup policy
known as the Superfund program is a prominent example.
The EPA approaches the hazardous waste cleanup decision
in a systematic manner, assessing the level of the risk posed by
a particular site. However, in doing so, the EPA incorporates a
series of conservatism biases that tend to lead to an overstate-
ment of the risk level. The agency's assessment of the risk is a
product of the level of concentration of a particular chemical,
the frequency of exposure to the chemical, the amount of expo-
sure, and the dose-response relationship linking the chemical
exposure to an estimated risk, such as cancer.69 In particular,
the EPA incorporates into the risk assessment an upper bound
value for each component of the assessment, such as the high-
est level of concentration of a chemical identified at the haz-
ardous waste site. The result is that the calculation compounds
the conservatism bias. Suppose that the agency calculates the
cancer risk at the site by multiplying a series of four parame-
ters, where for each parameter the agency uses the ninety-fifth
68. W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J.
OF LEGAL STUD. 107, 131 (2001).
69. JAMES T. HAMILTON & W. Kip Viscusi, CALCULATING RISKS? THE SPATIAL
AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY 64 (1999).
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percentile value of the parameter. If all parameters in the risk
calculation are ninety-fifth percentile values, the overall risk
calculation that compounds these biases has a much lower
chance than 0.05 of reflecting the actual risk. If there are four
such parameters in the risk calculation that are at the ninety-
fifth percentile, the chance that the calculated risk could be as
large as the estimated risk value is only 6.25 x 10-6, or under
1/100,000. An empirical assessment of the EPA's risk assess-
ment calculations for a large sample of Superfund cases found
that, even excluding upward biases in the dose-response relation-
ship that the EPA used, for over two-thirds of the groundwater
and soil risk pathways, the agency estimated the risks beyond the
ninety-ninth percentile of the actual risk distribution.
70
Regulatory agencies often rely on estimates of risk that com-
pound conservatism bias. For example, in its evaluation of the
risk of methyl mercury, the EPA relied on a reference dose that
started with a benchmark dose that is the lowest maternal
blood mercury concentration expected to lead to a five percent
increase in adverse health outcomes in children. Then, it took
the ninety percent lower confidence limit of this benchmark
dose and applied an additional safety factor by dividing the
dose by ten.
71
These numerical biases in calculating a risk represent only one
class of the many regulatory systematic risk assessment biases
with respect to estimating the risk reduction benefits of hazardous
waste cleanups. If the policy concern is with protecting people
from hazards in an effective manner, as we believe it should be,
then the agency should take into account the number of people
exposed to the risk, the extent of their exposure, and the extent of
their risk reduction. However, the EPA does not incorporate risks
to actual populations in the risk assessment practices. Instead, the
agency's procedures treat real and hypothetical exposures equal-
ly. Thus, in an extreme case of risk overestimation, the EPA
would value the risk to a single hypothetically exposed individual
in the future as being equivalent o a current risk to a large popu-
lation.72 Treating the hypothetical potential risk as equivalent to
70. Id. at 89.
71. Ted Gayer & Robert W. Hahn, The Political Economy of Mercury Regulation, 28
REGULATION 26, 29 (2005).
72. Id. at 91.
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an actual risk, coupled with a complete disregard for the number
of people exposed to the risk, leads to an overestimation of very
small risks and comparative inattention to larger risks. As a result,
cleaning up Superfund sites that pose real risks to actual popula-
tions looks as desirable as cleanups that might affect hypothetical
future populations. This bizarre practice caught the attention of
now Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer.73 While serving as an
appellate court judge, he encountered a Superfund cleanup case,
United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc.,74 in which the rationale for the
cleanup was to prevent children from eating the contaminated
dirt. Breyer was puzzled, however, as to why the EPA would be
undertaking such a cleanup, as he observed that there were no
dirt-eating children who would actually be affected because the
area was currently unoccupied swamp land.75
Setting aside all cost considerations, the pattern of risk per-
ception biases leads people to much prefer eliminating a risk to
reducing a risk by the same amount to a low level. A remaining
small risk looms much larger than it actually is. The quest for a
zero risk level, rather than a risk reduction that bears a reason-
able relation to the costs, becomes the objective. In practice,
government policies often institutionalize this targeting of a
zero risk level. A widespread practice throughout the federal
government is to design regulatory policies that do not simply
reduce the risk, but also provide an "adequate margin of safe-
ty" below the safe exposure level. Agencies are not entirely to
blame for the adequate margin of safety concept, as these re-
quirements may also be incorporated in the laws governing
regulatory policy. For example, the congressional drafting of
the Clean Air Act led to a law that requires the EPA to set am-
bient air quality standards that provide for an adequate margin
of safety below the safe exposure level.76 This approach of err-
ing on the side of more safety than is warranted by the pres-
ence of a nonzero risk level is also reflected in the Food and
Drug Administration's (FDA) desire to ensure that pharmaceu-
73. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 11-12 (1993).
74. 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990).
75. BREYER, supra note 73, at 12.
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
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tical regulations provide an adequate margin of safety.77 Like-
wise, the Department of Agriculture seeks to provide for a
margin of safety in its food safety efforts.78
The level of the risk is also consequential in terms of how peo-
ple respond to changes in a risk. Increases from the accustomed
risk level tend to generate extreme responses. Consumers encoun-
tering increases in their accustomed risk level for products tend to
respond in an alarmist manner.79 These responses in turn create
pressure for alarmist government regulations. The mechanism
driving this result is as follows. Going from a zero risk to a posi-
tive risk level moves the individual from a zero risk baseline to a
situation of overestimating small risks. Thus, the perceived
change in the risk is greater than it actually is, given the low prob-
ability. Newly discovered risks in food and beverages provoke
strong reactions as evidenced by the dramatic impact of the pres-
ence of benzene found in Perrier water in 1990.80 Government pol-
iies likewise frequently exhibit very strong responses to newly
discovered risks. A prominent example is the stringent govern-
ment responses to the outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalo-
pathy (BSE), known as mad cow disease. The U.K. government
may have overreacted by ordering the indiscriminate slaughter of
thousands of cattle rather than testing the cattle to assess potential
risks. Another example of excessive reactions to the mad cow cri-
sis was Japan's ban on the importation of U.S. beef because of the
exaggerated threat that U.S. beef posed. Unlike the United King-
dom, which had as many as 37,280 BSE cases in a single year, the
77 See Preclinical Considerations, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http:II
www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/briefing/3976Bl 02_F-FDA-Tab%205.pdf [http:II
perma.cc/QKF8-Z2BXI; Nonclinical Safety Evaluation of Drugs or Biologic Combina-
tions, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (March 2006), http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/
DOCKETS/98fr/05d-0004-gd1002.pdf [http://perma.cc/C5HU-MUSR].
78. See Appendix B: Compliance Guidelines for Cooling Heat-Treated Meat and Poultry
Products (Stabilization), U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE (updated June 1999),
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FRPubs/95-033F/95-033FAppendix%20B.htm
[http://perma.cc/GN8Z-6RTB].
79. See VISCUSI, supra note 16, at 127.
80. George James, Perrier Recalls Its Water in U.S. After Benzene Is Found in Bottles,




U.S. death toll was very low.81 In a similar overreaction, the 2014
Ebola threat led to the temporary closure of some U.S. schools as a
precautionary measure that appeared to be disproportionate to
the actual level of the risk.82 In Part V, we discuss many other
novel or emerging risks that also entail aspects of risk ambiguity
because of their novelty.
It is challenging to assess the soundness of a policy response
to terrorism risk. The policy response to the September 11,
2001, attack has been considerable, including increased screen-
ing of airline passengers, targeting of passengers based on the
perceived risks that they pose, and surveillance of phone calls
and emails. These measures surely have had some benefits that
are difficult to quantify, but they have also generated some
costs to civil liberties and privacy.83
The difficulty posed by small probabilities such as terrorism
risks is that, because the threats are fairly new, there is not a
sufficiently extensive body of data that can be used to assess
the risks. The level of these risks has escalated since before Sep-
tember 11, when most people would have assessed the risks as
close to zero. The pertinent information gained from the post-
September 11 period is not enough to form an accurate risk
judgment, given the low probability of terrorist attacks. The
most that can be hoped for is that the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security and other involved agencies assess the
risks in a reasonable manner and do not fall prey to the tenden-
cy to display an exaggerated response to increases in risk. Un-
fortunately, it is not feasible to assess the influence of such bi-
ases, as the regulatory impact analyses for homeland security
policies tend to lack the level of detail needed to determine
whether these policies represent judicious responses to a haz-
ard or are a reflection of public pressures that foster excessive
81. There were only three reported U.S. cases from 1989 to 2013. Joseph E. Aldy
& W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Regulation Lessons from Mad Cows, in 8 FOUND. & TRENDS IN
MICROECONOMics 301-02 (2013).
82. See Jennifer Steinhauer, In U.S., Fear of Ebola Closes Schools and Shapes Politics,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/us/fear-of-ebola-
closes-schools-and-shapes-politicshtml?-r=0 [http://perma.cc/9J97-JUQN].
83. See Susan Stellin, Airport Screening Concerns Civil Liberties Groups, N.Y. TIMES,
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responses. Instead of making a risk estimate, the Department of
Homeland Security often relies on a breakeven analysis to as-
sess how great a risk must be to warrant the policy. Given the
behavioral biases involved and the general proclivity to over-
react to small risks and newly emerging risks, there should be
increased attention to the desirability of these policies to the
extent that national security concerns permit.
V. RISK AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND EXCESSIVE
REGULATIONS OF DIMLY UNDERSTOOD RISKS
A common anomaly in risk-taking behavior is the reaction to
ambiguous risks, that is, risks whose magnitudes are not well
understood. Daniel Ellsberg analyzed this phenomenon, now
known as the Ellsberg Paradox, by documenting people's pref-
erence for knowing the probabilities of winning a prize.TM Sub-
sequent research has documented an analogous phenomenon
for losses, as people are averse to the uncertain probabilities
whether it is with respect to the chance of winning a prize or
the chance of suffering a loss.85 In each case, there is aversion to
undertaking a lottery that poses an ambiguous risk.
The following example illustrates the phenomenon. Suppose
automobile A poses a well-known defect risk of 2/1,000 over
the lifetime of the vehicle. Automobile B is newer to the mar-
ket, and there is a 50-50 chance that the defect risk for automo-
bile B is either 1/1,000 or 3/1,000, generating an expected defect
risk of 2/1,000. Each of these cars consequently poses an aver-
age defect risk of 2/1,000 and should be viewed as posing
equivalent risks. However, people generally exhibit a form of am-
biguity aversion that makes the precisely known risk of automo-
bile A less fearsome than the uncertain risk of automobile B.
Ambiguity aversion is a form of irrational behavior and
should not be confused with risk aversion in which people are
averse to the risk of incurring a large loss. People might quite
rationally choose to purchase a homeowners insurance policy
for $1,000 even though the expected losses are only $800. A
84. See Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. OF ECON.
643, 669 (1961).
85. See Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in Modeling Prefer-
ences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325, 359-60 (1992).
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very low probability of a catastrophic loss would make such
insurance attractive to a risk-averse person and could be quite
rational. What would not be rational is to be swayed by the un-
certainty regarding the probability. Thus, learning that there is
a definite 1/10,000 chance that lightning will hit the house
should make insurance just as attractive as having an uncertain
risk estimate for which the average risk is 1/10,000.
Government policies frequently reflect this ambiguity aver-
sion with novel risks. For example, court rulings tend to
demonstrate a bias against innovation and the attendant uncer-
tainties of novel drug products. In situations where there are
adverse health effects from new drugs, the courts are more
likely to levy sanctions against the producer.8 6 This bias on be-
half of the public is also reflected in product liability case ex-
periments using a sample of judges participating in a legal ed-
ucation program. The judges considered hypothetical cases
involving novel drugs and their associated liability risks. When
given a choice between a new drug posing an uncertain risk or
another drug with a higher known risk, most of the judges rec-
ommend that the company market the latter drug.
87
Another instance of ambiguity aversion involves genetically
modified organisms (GMOs), which "are organisms (i.e. plants,
animals or microorganisms) in which the genetic material
(DNA) has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally
by mating and/or natural recombination."8 8 GMOs have come
under fire and are increasingly subject to potential regulation
throughout the world. Engineered corn is a prominent example
of a GMO product. Although the regulation of GMOs is more
extensive in Europe than in the United States, some U.S. compa-
nies have begun labeling foods as GMO-free.9 In addition, there
has been increasing pressure for the government to regulate
86. See W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think about Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
26, 56 (1999).
87. See id. at 57.
88. Food safety: Frequently asked questions on genetically modified foods, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/foodsafety/areas-work/food-technology/faq-
genetically-modified-food/en/ [http://perma.cc/24EZ-T935].
89. For example, the Kettle Brand Krinkle Cut Potato Chips have the label "NON
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GMOs. Prominent consumer-oriented groups such as Consumer
Reports are calling for mandatory product labeling of GMOs.90 In
2014 some states had ballot referenda to require GMO labeling.91
Critics have characterized GMO foods as being very risky prod-
ucts of biotechnology, labeling them "Frankenfoods."92 The poli-
cy trade-off involved is that GMOs may pose uncertain risks that
currently are believed to be low in magnitude, but they reduce
the cost of producing agricultural products, which in turn low-
ers food prices and promotes better nutrition.
Nanoparticles are very fine particles between one and 100
nanometers in size. These novel components are ingredients in
a variety of products, such as sunscreens and polymers. As
with GMOs, nanoparticles are on the scientific frontier and
pose uncertain risks. They generate potentially substantial ben-
efits but have caused concern among environmental groups.
The EPA recently considered a regulatory proposal to require
manufacturers of products containing nanoscale chemicals to
give prior notice to the EPA before any use of these chemicals,
but the agency has since scaled back this proposal to a less
burdensome data collection requirement.93 The EPA also regu-
lates nearly all new nanochemicals.
94
The regulatory approach to these and related uncertainties
frequently relies on the precautionary principle. Although there
are many variants of the precautionary principle, in general the
principle places a weight on the worst-case outcome (better safe
than sorry) and places the burden of proof on the manufacturer
to show that the product is safe.95 From a statistical standpoint,
the most one can ever do is to reject the null hypothesis of zero
90. See Rebecca Kern, Consumer Reports: GMO Labeling Should Be Mandated on
Packaged Foods, 42 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 1181 (Oct. 20, 2014).
91. Rebecca Kern, Oregon, Colorado Ballot Measures Among State Efforts to Require
GMO Labeling, BLOOMBERG BNA PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. 42 PSLR 1181
(Oct. 20, 2014).
92. See generally HENRY MILLER & GREGORY CONKO, THE FRANKENFOOD MYTH:
How PROTEST AND POLITICS THREATEN THE BIOTECH REVOLUTION (2004).
93. See Pat Rizzuto, Narrow TSCA Proposal on Nanomaterials Sent to OMB in Place
of Broader EPA Rule, 42 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 1149 (Oct. 9, 2014).
94. See Pat Rizzuto, Nearly All New Nanoengineered Chemicals Are Regulated by EPA
Due to Potential Risks, 42 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 1183 (Oct. 16, 2014).




risk rather than proving that something poses zero risk. Moreo-
ver, even extensive testing addresses only the presence of immi-
nent hazards. The fact that there is no evidence of a nonzero risk
based on current testing does not preclude the potential for risks
that might emerge after a latency period. An example of such
deferred risks is the hazards associated with drugs given to
pregnant women. One such drug is diethylstilbestrol (DES),
which first caused birth defects in the children of mothers who
took the drug and then caused second-generation birth defects
in the babies of the children of the mothers who took the drug.96
Government policies frequently err on the side of safety by
avoiding uncertain risks, thus reflecting the biases found
among individuals. We advocate instead that the mean risk
should be the guide for single-period policy decisions. In situa-
tions of learning and potential adaptive behavior, the bias
should be in favor of the uncertain prospect. If, for example,
the uncertain drug proves to be beneficial, the patient can con-
tinue to use it. If the drug has an adverse effect or is ineffective,
the patient can switch to an alternative drug. This desirability
of ambiguity holds as well in situations where the risk of the
adverse outcome is death.
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VI. BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO REGULATIONS
Government regulations generally do not dictate policy out-
comes. Rather, they establish requirements and incentive struc-
tures that may or may not generate the intended results. De-
spite the government's interest in behavioral economics issues,
policymakers often seem to overlook the crucial role of this in-
termediate behavioral response.
People respond to changes in prices, whether they are due to
government policies or to markets. Demand curves for prod-
ucts are a downward function of the price. Should consumers,
for example, devote their resources to buying organic fruits
96. NAT'L CANCER INST., DIETHYLSTILBESTROL (DES) AND CANCER, http://
www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/DES [http://perma.cc/EA9Z-MEHZI.
97. These issues are explored in greater detail in W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Regulating Ambiguous Risks: The Less Than Rational Regulation of Pharma-
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and vegetables in order to reduce the cancer risk from pesti-
cides? Although affluent consumers may not be price sensitive,
the greater cost of organic food products may encourage con-
sumers to have fewer fresh fruits and vegetables in their diet.
For this reason, cancer researchers suggest that it is more im-
portant from a cancer reduction standpoint to consume fruits
and vegetables than to be concerned with the relatively minor
risks from pesticides on nonorganic produce.9"
In some instances, the failure of people and firms to take the
actions desired by the regulators arises from inadequate incen-
tives to comply with costly regulations. The entire set of stand-
ards initially enacted by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) involved safety requirements that im-
posed costly expenditures for firms to come into compliance.
However, the enforcement accompanying the sometimes rigid
standards involved low probabilities of inspection coupled
with modest fines, giving firms very little incentive to comply
with the regulations. The many studies documenting the negli-
gible or modest effect that this agency has had on safety often
trace its poor policy performance to inadequate incentives to
lead firms to comply with the standards.99
However, even if compliance is ensured, there may be counter-
productive behavioral responses. One type of behavioral response
can be traced to the way in which regulations alter the benefit-cost
trade-offs that people face. For example, the use of automobile
seat belts lowers the expected accident costs to drivers compared
to what they would be in the absence of seat belt use. Once buck-
led, however, the safety provided by the seat belt gives drivers a
greater incentive to drive faster to reduce travel time, thereby di-
minishing the beneficial effect of the seat belt requirement and
potentially leading to greater numbers of deaths of pedestrians
and motorcyclists.100
A related phenomenon linked to individual misperceptions
is the lulling effect of government safety measures. For in-
98. See Bruce N. Ames et al., Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENCE
271, 273 (1987).
99. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCuSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSI-
BILITIES FOR RISK 198 (1992).
100. See Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECON. 677, 677 (1975).
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stance, regulators often tout as "childproof" the safety caps for
potentially dangerous products such as prescription drugs and
automobile antifreeze. Some parents, believing that the caps
will protect their children from exposure to these hazards, have
become more lax about safety. The result has been an increase
in child-related poisonings that in some cases has offset the
beneficial effect of the caps. More generally, the reduced pre-
cautions resulting from the behavioral response to the caps has
muted the effect of the caps so that there is no evident benefit
from the regulation in reducing child poisonings.10 1
Although government agencies have not acknowledged the
existence of a counterproductive impact of safety caps, private
companies have been more cautious. Before introducing child-
resistant devices on cigarette lighters, Bic commissioned a field
study to ensure that the device would be safety enhancing.
Surveyed parents indicated that they would be less concerned
about safety in the presence of this safety mechanism. Nonethe-
less, the field test indicated that, although parents were more
likely to give children access to a lighter with the safety mech-
anism, the safety device was a sufficient deterrent such that on
balance the device was safety enhancing.102
VII. FAILURE TO EXPLOIT BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS
Exploiting the insights derived from behavioral economics
can indeed advance the regulatory response to market failures.
For example, the externalities of carbon emissions are highly
dependent on individual decisions about energy usage, which
are influenced by information on peer comparisons;103 patients'
adherence to taking prescribed drugs affects health care
costs;10 4 and people's responsiveness to evacuation warnings
affects the losses from natural disasters.105 The menu of policy
101. W. Kip Viscusi, The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-Resistant Packaging on
Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 324, 326-27 (1984).
102. See W. Kip Viscusi & Gerald Cavallo, Safety Behavior and Consumer Responses to
Cigarette Lighter Safety Mechanisms, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 441,450 (1996).
103. See Ayres et al., supra note 60.
104. See Niteesh K. Choudhry et al., Full Coverage for Preventive Medications after
Myocardial Infarction, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2088, 2093 (2011).
105. See Matthew E. Kahn, The Death Toll from Natural Disasters: The Role of In-
come, Geography, and Institutions, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 271, 283 (2005).
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options sometimes includes attempts to exploit the role of indi-
vidual behavior, but opportunities to capitalize on the role of
behavioral linkages are often not fully recognized.
The labeling policy for motor vehicles discussed above illus-
trates the potential use of a behavioral approach to foster the
regulatory objective of energy conservation coupled with a lack of
confidence in its efficacy. In 2011, the EPA instituted a new label-
ing system for automobile fuel efficiency that would convey in-
formation to consumers about the private energy costs of the ve-
hicle as well as the social consequences in terms of traditional pol-
pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions.106 Undertaking focus
group studies as in EPA's study of energy efficiency labeling is
not a substitute for scientific tests of the likely efficacy of labels, as
they only provide an informal group that is subject to the influ-
ence of the discussion leader and particularly influential partici-
pants, a phenomenon known as "the loudmouth problem."
10 7
After mandating a new labeling rule, the EPA subsequently is-
sued mandatory fuel efficiency requirements without considering
the effects of the labeling rule, thus resorting to a command-and-
control approach. In effect, the agency displayed an implicit lack
of confidence in behavioral policy mechanisms.
The FDA's proposed graphic cigarette warnings also reflect
an underlying lack of confidence in policies about warnings
that are in the spirit of "nudge" interventions. Since 1966 ciga-
rette packs have included mandated hazard warnings.0 8 The
content of the warnings has evolved over time, but available
evidence indicates that people are well informed of the dangers
of smoking cigarettes. Moreover, evidence in the literature in-
dicates that to be effective, warnings must provide new infor-
mation. Despite this evidence on informed behavior, the FDA
proposed a series of graphic warnings for cigarettes in re-
sponse to a legislative requirement that the agency develop
such warnings. This proposal was overturned by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which concluded that
there was not "a shred of evidence" that the graphic warnings
106. See 49 C.F.R. § 575.401 (2012).
107. PHILIP KOTLER & KEVIN LANE KELLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 102 (14th
ed. 2012).
108. For a history of cigarette warnings, see generally W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING:
MAKING THE RISKY DECISION (1992).
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would lead to any reduction in smoking prevalence rates, even
based on the agency's own regulatory impact analysis.109 Thus, a
regulatory intervention intended to alter behavior in effect ig-
nored the behavioral evidence on its likely efficacy. The court
concluded that there would be no apparent benefit to outweigh
the infringement on corporate speech caused by the warnings.
VIII. ASYMMETRIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
GAINS AND LOSSES
From the standpoint of the benefit-cost analysis framework
that we advocate, losses and gains should be treated symmetri-
cally. Thus, if a prescription drug leads to an increase of five
expected deaths but also a reduction of ten expected deaths, the
net effect is to reduce the number of expected deaths by five.
Such balanced arithmetic may not, however, be consistent
with patterns of individual preferences. Losses may loom much
greater than gains. A suitable measure of the difference in atti-
tudes between losses and gains is the monetary value associat-
ed with the change in the risk. People are willing to pay much
less for a reduction in risk than the amount that they require
for a comparable risk increase. Thus, they value the loss associ-
ated with risk increases much more highly than the gain from
risk decreases. Reviews of the gap between the willingness to
pay for products and environmental goods and the counterpart
willingness to accept values for losing these same products or
environmental goods indicate average ratios of willingness to
accept to willingness to pay as high as 7 in one comprehensive
review10 and 6.23 in a similar study."'
This type of phenomenon is embedded in government poli-
cies for products with competing risk effects, such as prescrip-
tion drugs. The emphasis on adverse consequences is incorpo-
rated in the Hippocratic Oath: Primum non nocere, or, first, do
no harm. This emphasis sets the tone for regulation by the
FDA. If the starting point is to avoid harm, then there will be a
109. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
110. John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTAIWTP Studies,
44 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426, 428 (2002).
111. Tuba Tunqel & James K. Hammitt, A new meta-analysis on the WTP/WTA
disparity, 68 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 175, 181 (2014).
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greater emphasis on losses than on gains. This approach will
lead to the failure to approve drugs that on balance may en-
hance health but have competing effects.
The reluctance to provide such approval is particularly great
when the losses and gains arise in a quite different manner. If
the FDA approves a drug that leads to harm, that is an error of
commission. If comparable expected harms result from the FDA
failing to approve a drug, that is an error of omission, and these
losses will tend to receive less weight. Notably, the losses often
are more visible in the case of errors of commission. The patients
who die after taking a dangerous drug are identified lives. By
contrast, the patients whose lives are lost because they failed to
get the benefits of a promising new drug often cannot be identi-
fied. Most of us do not know which diseases will affect us, so the
small probabilistic stake that each of us has in a drug that might
or might not help us in the future dampens our concern with its
availability. Sometimes, a well-defined patient constituency that
can lobby for differential treatment can overcome this insuffi-
cient attention to beneficial new drugs with competing risk ef-
fects. For example, after vigorous lobbying by AIDS groups, the
FDA put patient access to these drugs on a faster track.
IX. INCONSISTENT TRADE-OFFS
A potential source of individual irrationality is a lack of con-
sistency in decisions across different domains of decision. Ob-
taining a payday loan at highly inflated interest rates rather than
exploiting one's remaining line of credit on a credit card might,
for example, be a signal of a consumer's financial irrationality if
the consumer could obtain the needed funds at a lower cost. Be-
having in an inconsistent manner makes the consumer worse off
by imposing additional finance costs and taking away funds that
the consumer could have used to advance personal welfare.
The counterpart inconsistent preference problem is potential-
ly of greater consequence for Congress and government agen-
cies. Unlike the textbook consumer, who is assumed to have a
single set of preferences, there is no single set of preferences
guiding government policies. Members of Congress often ad-
vance their narrowly defined parochial interests, as evidenced
by the "bridge to nowhere" and other pork barrel projects that
bring resources back to the congressperson's home district.
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Similarly, different agencies are not guided by a well-defined
national interest but have specific legislative mandates. The
result is that agencies tend to develop tunnel vision whereby
the particular policy concerns of the agency are of dominant
interest. The Clean Air Act's complete disregard for costs in
setting ambient air quality standards is perhaps the most ex-
treme example of institutionalized myopia. Unfortunately,
tunnel vision is not unique to air pollution regulations. The
U.S. Supreme Court has rejected efforts to require OSHA to
undertake policies that balance benefits and costs because the
agency's legislative mandate requires that the agency ensure
worker safety if doing so is feasible, irrespective of the cost.
112
The rampant inconsistency in government policies is exempli-
fied in the widely varying costs per expected life saved across
government agencies.113 Although there have been several tallies
of such costs, here we will focus on the Office of Management
and Budget listing that U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen
Breyer highlighted in his commentary on regulatory policies.
Rather than spending the same cost per life saved in different
domains, the costs often vary quite widely. The regulations from
the Department of Transportation tend to be quite cost-effective,
with costs per life saved on the order of $3 million or less per life
saved. However, at the high end are regulations such as the EPA
hazardous waste listing for wood-preserving chemicals, with a
cost per life saved of $5.7 trillion. Also at the high end is the EPA
Superfund program, which has a median cost per case of cancer
averted of $6.4 billion.114 Of course, in these extreme cases, the
agency is not in fact spending billions on the particular policy
option. But when the expected lives saved denominator is very
small because of the negligible safety benefits of the policy, the
cost per life saved figure escalates.
These wildly varying levels of efficacy highlight clear-cut
opportunities to make government policies more rational. We
make two principal observations. First, these vast differences in
cost effectiveness demonstrate that, for the same level of costs,
112. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 491 (1981).
113. The rationality reference point is for the marginal costs per life saved to be
equated across policy domains. Available data are generally in terms of average costs
per life saved, which also are instructive in that they highlight dear-cut inefficiencies.
114. HAMILTON & VISCUSI, supra note 69, at 125.
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government policies could save more lives by redirecting com-
paratively ineffective regulatory expenditures to agencies that
have lower costs per life saved for their regulations. Second,
there are real opportunity costs to wasteful expenditures.
Funds that are squandered on ineffective policies could be used
instead by consumers to promote their well-being. Indeed, be-
cause having additional financial resources enhances one's
health, there is a health risk trade-off associated with inefficient
regulatory policies, so that on balance such policies may be
harming health rather than enhancing it.115
X. CONCLUSION
In recent years, there has been a shift in the traditional eco-
nomics approach of justifying government interventions based
on the existence of market failures such as externalities, public
goods, asymmetric information, and market power. Influenced
by psychological studies that find systematic biases in how in-
dividuals make decisions, the field of behavioral economics has
led to recommendations for government policies. These rec-
ommendations frequently come in the form of soft regulations
or "nudges," to correct behavioral shortfalls that lead individu-
als to make decisions that cause themselves harm.
The behavioral economics findings that document systematic
anomalies that lead to irrational decisions are important contri-
butions to the field of economics. While these biases can be justi-
fications for government intervention, our evidence suggests
that a framework of behavioral public choice should take into
account that policymakers and regulators are themselves behav-
ioral agents subject to psychological biases, and further, that
they are public agents subject to political pressures and biases
endemic in the political process. The behavioral paradox is that
government policies are subject to a wide range of behavioral
failures that in many cases become incorporated in the overall
policy strategy. We have documented many instances in which
government policies institutionalize rather than overcome be-
115. For a discussion of the various risk-risk models in economics, see W. Kip
Viscusi, The Value of Individual and Societal Risks to Life and Health, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 385, 432-35 (W. Kip Viscusi &
Mark J. Machina eds., 2014).
1006 [Vol. 38
Behavioral Public Choice
havioral anomalies, and in some cases, attempt to justify ineffi-
cient "hard" regulations, such as mandates, based on the weakly
supported need to correct individual irrationality.
Given that government policymaking is not immune to behav-
ioral failures, we suggest a more cautious approach, one that in-
corporates the insights of behavioral economics in a way that is
less dismissive of the merits of individual choice. Rather than
assuming that any class of behavioral anomalies constitutes a
sufficient rationale for overriding consumer preferences, gov-
ernment agencies should assess the empirical prevalence and
magnitude of the behavioral failings as they specifically pertain
to the policy context. If there are apparent anomalies, there
should also be an exploration of whether these deviations from
economics norms stem from legitimate differences in prefer-
ences or are in fact errors that, if corrected, would enhance wel-
fare. Thus, in the design of subsequent interventions, there
should be increased recognition of the legitimate differences in
consumer preferences that may account for purported behavior-
al failings. Policymakers should also recognize the behavioral
failings likely to be incorporated in their policy responses due to
public pressure or the behavioral failures of policymakers. Fun-
damental behavioral failures are often embedded in the current
policy strategies. Any critical review of private behavioral fail-
ures should be accompanied by a comparable assessment of
government failures.
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